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Foreword 
 
In 2004 – the year of the Australian-US Free Trade Agreement – I was 
asked by a number of people whether anyone had looked at the history 
of Australian copyright law and policy. While there were bits and pieces 
available I could not point to any sustained and conceptual analysis of 
the path of copyright law in this country. It was my good fortune in 
2005 (via a lead from my sister Anne Fitzgerald) to stumble upon the 
excellent work Ben Atkinson had undertaken as part of his LLM at the 
University of Sydney. Ever since that time I have recommended it to 
anyone who is interested in the topic. 
Ben is an outstanding scholar and this book is testament to his ability. 
In it he manages to blend his passion for history with the thorny topic 
of copyright politics and law, managing to paint a fascinating picture of 
Australian history. I found it interesting to see the role different  
people had played in this story and hope one day with Ben’s help we 
might be able to assemble a number of these personalities together in 
old Parliament House in Canberra to recreate and repurpose some of 
the debate.  
At a deeper level Ben challenges us to consider the very rationale of 
copyright law. Ben’s experience in working with government policy on 
copyright, his passion for history and the context of the AUSFTA 
provides the framework for understanding what has occurred in the 
past and what we face in the future. His work could have simply been a 
descriptive account of the history of the legislation but he has chosen 
to confront us with his ultimate conclusion that copyright law is fuelled 
by a volatile mix of ever–increasing vested interests. Ben’s scholarly 
analysis, along with the fine detail of the history of the 1905, 1912 and 
1968 Copyright Acts provides any student, policy maker, practitioner or 
user of copyright law with a tremendous platform on which to build 
understanding, argument and ultimately policy direction.  
For me this book highlights the need for us to remain vigilant about the 
boundaries of copyright law and to find the balance that will prosper 
social and cultural as well as economic life. In this regard it is 
interesting to note the rise of large access corporations like Google Inc 
and Yahoo! Inc that are driven by their business models to provide 
greater access. They will provide a serious challenge and counterweight 
 
xx 
to the interests that currently dominate copyright politics. In 
highlighting – in a “public choice” methodology – the rent seeking 
actors over the last 100 years, Ben opens our minds to the possibility of 
new rent seekers that may fundamentally change the way we view 
copyright into the future. A history written in 100 years time (with the 
benefit of hindsight) will no doubt talk about the Internet era and how 
new interests influenced the law making process to provide us with a 
new type of law around networked information relations and access.  
I commend Ben on his excellent work and anticipate the future 
volumes. Like any good historian he must realise that he has only just 
begun his long journey into the history and politics of Australian 
copyright law. But in doing so he has unlocked a box that has been 
closed for far too long. My hope is that other researchers will follow 
him in this field of endeavour and provide a truly Australian 
perspective on the past, present and future of copyright law and policy. 
 
 
Professor Brian Fitzgerald 
Director of the Intellectual Property Research Program 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
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Preface 
 
This book grew out of my wish, when working for the Australian 
Commonwealth government, to find out whether copyright laws were 
made to encourage the production of copyright material. According to 
lobbyist after lobbyist visiting Canberra departmental offices, without 
the protection of more and more proprietary rights, creators would 
cease to produce. Without more laws and better enforcement, 
producers would have no reason to continue production because free 
riders, or “pirates”, would destroy their margins. Arguments made in 
favour of more copyright regulation applied equally to other forms of 
intellectual property protection. 
Maximum property rights, according to the lobbyists, provided 
producers of non-rivalrous goods with the incentive to continue 
production. However, the incentive theory of intellectual property 
regulation, accepted uncritically at large as the inspiration for past 
regulators, seemed to me to be a counterfeit rationale that disguised 
price discrimination. I wanted to know whether policy makers and 
legislators really were, as the theory implied, disinterested and 
farsighted creators of optimal regulation. Did they make copyright laws 
to encourage efficient production and dissemination? 
This book tries to answer that question. Hopefully, it will serve as a 
reference work for those who debate the purpose and function of 
copyright laws specifically and intellectual property laws generally. The 
work is intended to help resolve theoretical questions by supplying a 
detailed history of copyright law-making in Australia, and (though not 
comprehensively) the United Kingdom. I intended to make it readable. 
I tried to bring the actors in the drama of copyright history to life on 
the page and let their words and actions shape the book. Inevitably my 
opinions and prejudices influenced the narrative.  
My view, arising out of my findings, is that the copyright term is grossly 
excessive. Possibly the simplest way – in theory – to cure the ills of 
copyright over-regulation is to cut the term of protection. A short term 
promotes dissemination and still provides plenty of opportunity for the 
producer to profit. What is the optimum period? No-one knows and 
no-one can know. I favour 18 years from the date of production – the 
age of legal majority. Intrinsically, a copyright work is no more the 
property of its creator than a child is the property of its parent. Its 
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identity and existence are things distinct. The creator, like the parent, 
should have legally enforceable parental rights over the work. But 18 
years from production (birth), the work (child) should be legally free 
from its creator’s control. 
I don’t wish to obtrude my views on readers. I hope this book allows 
them to understand how copyright laws were made and to draw some 
conclusions about how they might be made better in the future. 
 
Benedict Atkinson 
 
1 
Introduction 
Aim 
The purpose of this book is to examine the historical record, 
concentrating on the development of copyright law in Australia, to 
determine the truth of modern assumptions about the origins and 
function of copyright law. Modern governments espouse a uniform 
theory of copyright regulation. This is that intellectual property laws 
provide would-be creators and producers with the incentive to create, 
produce and disseminate subject matter or information that society 
consumes for entertainment, education, business activity and other 
private and public purposes. 
According to the theory, optimum innovation means optimum 
diffusion of information,1 and governments today assert that securing 
both is the object of regulation. But the modern theory of copyright 
espoused by government – the “copyright orthodoxy” – is untested, 
however obvious its conclusions may seem. Scholars have examined 
aspects of the history of copyright law in the 18th and 19th centuries, as 
well as international copyright law-making, but none seems to have 
looked closely at the historical record – especially the archives of 
government and newspapers, and parliamentary debates – of the 
pivotal period of copyright law-making, the 20th century. 
As a result, we have little knowledge of the motives of the legislators 
who made the laws of copyright and we have even less knowledge of 
what non-legislators, their views often expressed in the opinion and 
correspondence columns of newspapers, thought of regulation. 
Copyright theory exists in an evidentiary vacuum. Until the empirical 
task of looking at the record is complete, theories about why and how 
copyright works remain speculation. And the official explanation 
embraced by government remains problematic. 
                                                     
1 According to the Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles 
Agreement, AGPS, 2000, (“the Ergas Report”) prepared for the Commonwealth 
govenment in 2000: “[b]alancing between providing incentives to invest in 
innovation on one hand, and for efficient diffusion of innovation on the other, is a 
central, and perhaps the crucial, element in the design of intellectual property 
laws.”(P5). 
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In summary, economic theory – or any other theory – concerning 
copyright is unverified, and until now, has been untested.2 Insofar as 
current assumptions can be tested empirically, the best approach must 
be to consider the historical record to determine what was in the minds 
of makers of copyright law. If what they asserted the purpose of 
regulation to be turns out to differ from what theorists say the purpose 
of regulation is, then copyright orthodoxy must be admitted to present 
a deficient account of copyright’s purpose and function. More 
importantly, if faced with a crisis of orthodoxy, government policy-
makers ought to reconsider their assumptions.3 
The aim of this book is to shed a clear light on Australian copyright 
law-making in the 20th century, and expose to daylight the motives that 
created modern copyright law. It presents detailed evidence about 
copyright law-making that allows the reader to make judgments about 
the extent to which the reality of law-making matches the theory of 
copyright’s function. 
Method 
The premise of the book is simple: as regulation is created by humans, 
the best method of determining why and for what purpose laws were 
                                                     
2 Empirical evidence adduced in support of copyright regulation consists of 
impressive industry statistics. The US International Intellectual Property Alliance 
releases annual reports which in recent years have shown that the US copyright 
industries continue to grow rapidly, generate nearly US$1 trillion in revenue and 
earn more from exports than any other industrial sector.  
3 Government occasionally declares itself willing to reconsider copyright 
assumptions. In Australia in 1996, the Copyright Law Review Committee published 
a paper Copyright Reform: A Consideration of Rationales, Interests and Objectives (Office of 
Legal Information and Publishing, AGD), the purpose of which was “to stimulate 
debate on the arguments made in support of the modern copyright regime.” The 
CLRC’s subsequent reports on simplification of the Australian Copyright Act did 
not appear to have been influenced in any way by the 1996 paper. In 2002, the 
British Government published the report of the International Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, which considered the application of intellectual 
property rights in Third World countries. The report, Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy, in the words of the Economist (14 September 2002) 
delivered a “central message [that] is both clear and controversial: poor places 
should avoid committing themselves to rich-world systems of IPR protection 
unless such systems are beneficial to their needs. Nor should rich countries, which 
professed so much interest in ‘sustainable development’ … push for anything 
stronger.”  
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made is to examine what those who participated in the process leading 
to legislation wrote or said about the subject matter of regulation. 
This means looking at parliamentary records, government departmental 
records and reports (the archives of the Commonwealth Attorney 
General’s Department, from 1904 to 1968, as well as records of the 
Prime Minister’s office), and reports in, and correspondence to, British 
and Australian newspapers in the periods 1909–1912, 1947–1956 and 
1967–1969. The emphasis of research in on the Australian primary 
record, but as Australian legislation depended on British legislative 
precedent, the book pays considerable attention to events and debates 
in Britain at relevant times. 
In this book, the participants in the legislative dramas that created the 
modern law of copyright in Australia speak for themselves. From their 
collective voice, it is hoped, something of the truth about how and why 
our copyright law came to be emerges. 
The thesis 
Once the claims made about the function of copyright regulation are 
examined in the context of how the laws actually came to be passed, a 
simple and dramatic thesis emerges: the copyright law was not actually 
made according to the design attributed to it by some theorists. Official 
orthodoxy about the purpose of copyright regulation and the function 
of copyright regulation is not supported by historical evidence.  
The historical record – Hansard, government archival records and 
contemporary newspaper accounts and correspondence – tell a story 
not at all similar to that posited by copyright advocates. The economic 
success of the copyright industries is put forward as evidence of the 
necessity for copyright laws. But all copyright industries flourished 
without copyright protection. The radio broadcasting industry operated 
successfully without copyright protection for nearly 40 years. 
Copyright orthodoxy tells us that without copyright laws granting 
creators and producers multiple rights to control production and 
supply, they will cease to produce. But in the period when the 
phonographic industry could make unauthorised recordings of musical 
works, music creators composed music. The absence of copyright 
protection did not affect the productive incentive of copyright 
industries. The record shows that without protection the recording, 
broadcasting and software industries grew like the green bay tree.  
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Orthodoxy also tells us that the corollary of creators and producers 
declining to produce is drastically reduced dissemination of copyright 
material, leading to a precipitous decline in social welfare. But the 
historical record informs us that most legislators were indifferent to 
fine questions about disseminating information. If regulation works to 
disseminate the output of creators and producers, it does so by accident 
rather than design. 
In short, the research explained in this book overturns long-held 
assumptions about copyright regulation and illustrates that the official 
consensus about the purpose and function of copyright law relies on a 
false interpretation of history. 
Narrative and counter-narrative 
The sway of copyright orthodoxy is partly explained by a process of 
immanence: the official mind absorbed the lessons taught by writers 
like Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo (prominent in the activities 
leading to creation of the Berne Union), accepted generalisations about 
authors’ rights, and came to accept unswervingly the principle that 
property rights are just reward for the ingenuity, effort and investment 
that turns abstractions into products.  
Why does it matter whether the historical record supports copyright 
orthodoxy? Because copyright is property and property relations play a 
paramount role in creating social equality, and, more particularly, 
reducing inequality – in and between nations. To create property means 
to define and expropriate subject matter. The act of expropriation is 
exclusionary – for one person to possess property, another person 
must be excluded. The more that people are excluded from the benefits 
of property, or the more that subject matter is expropriated for the 
benefit of a few, the more inequality grows. The more that 
governments increase the scope of intellectual property rights – by, for 
example, extending the term of protection – the more people they 
exclude from freely reading, viewing, copying or otherwise dealing with 
the subject matter protected.  
The argument against orthodoxy is not necessarily an argument against 
intellectual property. It points simply to an unwelcome truth: if 
governments wish to discourage the growth of inequality and more 
inequality, then intellectual property rights must be circumscribed not 
enlarged. This proposition is validated by the outcomes of international 
trade politics. The United States is, with resolve and far-sighted 
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calculation, entrenching its comparative productive advantage through 
the export of intellectual property products. Countries trading with the 
US must make themselves safe havens for the sale of US IP exports in 
exchange for partial access to US markets.  
But the trade highlights their inferiority – the US IP hegemony, and the 
secondary hegemonies of lesser IP exporters, such as the United 
Kingdom, guarantee in perpetuity the sway of rich countries over 
poorer. Continuing inequality is the sure outcome of international trade 
in IP products because the rich countries are owners and the poor 
renters. As IP rights spread across the globe, the US and some other 
rich countries own more, demand more and give less. The littoral 
valleys of California possess the world more totally than ever the 
Romans did. Inequality also pertains within rich countries. The wealth 
of successful entertainers reflects the wealth of copyright industries. 
The extraordinary riches of software barons testify to the efficacy of 
copyright laws as a guarantor of profits. Property rights that generate 
wealth also create poverty – the poverty of opportunity to read, watch 
and listen, to learn and understand. For this reason, it is important to 
examine closely the justifications for copyright laws, to determine how 
much they are validated by history or how much they constitute a self-
serving narrative. 
The facts of history – what legislators said, what the correspondents to 
newspapers wrote, and what government departments were instructed 
to do – support a counter-narrative of copyright. According to this 
counter-narrative, individuals, acting for institutions or corporations, 
made the modern law of copyright, for their own gain and for the 
benefit of the coteries they served or identified with. 
Public choice theory 
The counter-narrative of copyright accords with what public choice 
theory tells us about government behaviour. The theory, originated by 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in the Calculus of Consent4,  
holds that governments, like private individuals, act in a self-interested 
way, misusing authority for financial and other gain. Public choice 
                                                     
4 University of Michigan Press, 1962. See also the work of Noam Chomsky, 
especially in Manufacturing Consent, The Political Economy of the Mass Media (with 
Edward Herman), Pantheon Books, 1988, in which he argues that the media 
radically distorts the flow of information at the behest of private commercial 
interests.  
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theory has revolutionised the way economists think about government 
behaviour and gives a pessimistic account of how much regulation 
reflects broad public interest as opposed to sectional. Many economists 
now take for granted that legislation is made not by government 
consulting the mass of the public, but rather organised public groups – 
industries for example.5 
Public choice principles buttress Edwin Hettinger’s observation that the 
justifiability of our intellectual property institutions is not settled by the facile 
assertion that our system of patents, copyrights and trade secrets provides necessary 
incentives for innovation and ensures maximally healthy competitive enterprise. This 
argument is not as easy to construct as one might think; substantial empirical 
evidence is needed.6  
If public choice theory takes a pessimistic view of government 
behaviour, it also postulates that the solution to misgovernment is to 
expose official decision-making to critical scrutiny by creating a flow of 
information about how and why decisions are made. This book 
supplies some of the empirical evidence needed to determine how 
effective and equitable our copyright laws are. 
Some theoretical considerations 
What, then, does the theoretical literature of copyright say? The theory 
adopted by government – that regulation creates a dynamic connection 
between output and dissemination by creating the conditions that 
encourage innovation and production – is one thing. But to what extent 
is it supported by the work of the independent analysts of the academy? 
The first explanations for copyright law came from lawyers, not 
economists. They tended to function more as ideologues than 
disinterested theorists, and justified copyright a priori as a species of 
                                                     
5 Australia’s polity has responded to some of the issues raised by public choice 
theory by introduction of the so-called “competition reforms”, which led, among 
other things, to the formation of the Ergas Committee in 1999. However, review of 
the kind undertaken by the Committee, while important and useful, is made on the 
government’s terms and government is not a disinterested analyst of the merits of 
regulation. If we decline to assume that the government, as legislator, automatically 
represents the public interest, if instead we assume the possibility that various third 
parties interpose between government and public, it becomes crucial to identify how 
legislation is made. 
6 Edwin C Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
(1989) 18, p51.  
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property. Lawyers were active in expounding rationales for copyright 
law from the literary property debates of the 18th century and through 
the 19th century. For instance, Thomas Scrutton, who advised the 
British Government in matters of copyright policy in the first decade of 
the 20th century, and sat on the Law of Copyright Committee in 19097 
wrote The Laws of Copyright: An Examination of the Principles which Regulate 
Literary and Artistic Property in England and Other Countries (John Murray, 
1883) and The Law of Copyright, (William Clowes and Sons, 1896).  
Economists were active in the 19th century in academic examination of 
the patent system, first as supporters, then critics.8 The Economist, the 
mouthpiece of British economic liberalism said in 1851, “patents are 
artificial stimuli to improvident exertions … they cheat people by 
promising what they cannot perform … they rarely give security to 
really good inventions, and elevate into importance a number of trifles 
… no possible good can ever come of a Patent Law, however 
admirably it may be framed.”  
As the legislature progressively extended the scope of copyright 
regulation, the natural law narrative that underlies property discourse 
came to dominate official thinking. As it applied to copyright law, and 
stripped of rhetoric, this account expounded a simple proposition: 
copyright laws are justified because authors and producers deserve to 
profit from their work.9 
To this simple formula, lawyers at the end of the 19th century added a 
utilitarian hypothesis attractive to the Victorians as well as moderns: 
copyright protection, by rewarding labour and investment, stimulated 
production.10 The problem with this account, which formed a bridge 
between the 18th century view of copyright as the natural perquisite of 
authorship, and the 20th century idea of copyright as the reward for 
investment, is that it justified rather than explained. 
The move away from partisan assumptions about the necessity for 
copyright law began with the eminent English economist Arnold Plant 
                                                     
7 The Gorrell Committee. Most of its recommendations were implemented in the 
British Copyright Act of 1911.  
8 See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law, 
Cambridge University Press 1999, p149, fns30–31. 
9 See Hettinger, supra, for an explanation of why the lawyers’ explanation proved so 
influential. As Hettinger noted: “Perhaps the most powerful intuition supporting 
property rights is that people are entitled to the fruits of their labour.” (At p36).  
10 See Bently and Sherman, supra, pp174–5.  
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in 193411 and continued with the still more eminent American 
economist, Kenneth Arrow, in 1962.12 In the 1960s, a growing number 
of economists began to subject copyright regulation to economic 
analysis, extending the process begun one century earlier, when 
utilitarian theorists turned their attention to patent law.13 
Plant, unequivocally, and Arrow, indirectly, were critical of copyright 
laws. The former, who argued unsuccessfully before the Gregory 
Committee in 1951 for a radically circumscribed term of copyright, 
declared regulation to be socially inefficient.14 The latter concluded  
that while monopoly rights may provide a producer with the incentive 
to produce, the offsetting desire to maintain monopoly profits is more 
likely to create a conservative rather than innovative approach to 
production. An inference could be made from Arrow’s work that  
if copyright law provides an incentive to produce, it does not 
automatically provide an incentive to maximise either production  
or dissemination. 
Soon after Arrow’s intervention, another economist, Dan Lacy, 
published an article on the economics of publishing, in which he  
argued that the “communications industries” – the intermediaries 
between the creators and consumers of copyright material – dictated 
                                                     
11 A Plant, “The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books” (1934) Economica, 1, pp 
167–95.  
12 “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention” (1962) The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton NJ: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Princeton University Press, pp609–26.   
13 For a discussion of the optimising trend in patent law towards the patenting of 
business methods, see Michal Likhovski, Michael Spence and Michael Molineaux, 
“The First Mover Monopoly: A study in patenting business methods in Europe”, 
Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre’ (2000) WP 05/00. It is not difficult to 
discern a pattern of copyright optimisers imitating the example of patenting 
optimisers, the process perhaps explaining the progressive departure from strict 
adherence to the idea that copyright applies only to expression, not ideas.  
14 The Board of Trade Copyright Committee 1951 chaired first by Lord Reading 
and then Lord Gregory. The Committee expressed some sympathy for Plant’s 
arguments but declared itself unable to accept them following the decision of the 
Berne Union at its 1948 Brussels Conference to make a 50 year compulsory term 
mandatory for ratifying countries. In his 1934 article on copyright, supra, Plant 
argued for a compulsory licence in publishing operative five years after first 
publication. His argument traced the history of publishers securing legislative 
privileges in Britain from Tudor times onwards. 
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the flow of information according to criteria that might not promote 
optimum dissemination.15 
Then in 1966, Hurt and Schuchman, in an article titled “The Economic 
Rationale for Copyright”,16 identified the central, and continuing, 
problem of copyright theory: the evidence to demonstrate that 
copyright regulation provides an incentive to produce is lacking from 
the literature. In the same period, the transaction-cost theory of Ronald 
Coase, like Arrow a Nobel Prize winner (and strongly influenced in his 
early career by Arnold Plant) provided the grounds for an argument 
that copyright regulation increases transaction costs, thereby distorting 
the allocation of resources to the detriment of social welfare. 
Coase’s ideas, expounded most famously in two articles, The Nature of 
the Firm, published in Britain in 1937,17 and The Problem of Social Cost, 
published in the United States in 1961,18 focused on the economic cost 
of transactions. His research supported the view that regulation tended 
to increase transaction costs (and detract from social welfare) while the 
market, unfettered, tended to allocate resources efficiently. Coase’s 
work tends to buttress the arguments both of advocates for intellectual 
property regulation and copyright sceptics. On the one hand, his work 
supports the view that property laws designed in very close 
consultation with industries are likely to create economic inefficiency. 
But Coase, like Arrow, made clear his belief that property rights are 
necessary if transactions are to take place efficiently. Coase’s work 
provided the framework for the work of theoreticians of the law and 
economics movement, such as Harold Demsetz. Coase also did 
substantial research into broadcasting policy in Britain and the United 
States (see British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly, Longmans, 1950) and 
concluded that granting property rights to broadcasters solved 
problems of market failure.  
Non-economists also began to undermine the natural law argument 
that copyright is a just reward for individual merit. In 1971, the 
philosopher John Rawls in A Theory of Justice,19 posited that native 
endowments – including the ability to expend effort – and chance, 
                                                     
15 “The Economics of Publishing or Adam Smith and Literature” (1963) Daedalus 
92, p.42.  
16 R Hurt and Schuchman in American Economic Review (1966) May, pp421–432.  
17 Collected in O Williamson and S Winter, The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution 
and Development, Oxford University Press, 1991. 
18 Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp1–44. 
19 Harvard University Press, 1971.  
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rather than objectively determined merit, determine individual rewards. 
Applying this theory in modified form, Edwin Hettinger, after 
affirming that effort (though not talent) should be rewarded, observed 
that intellectual property regulation does not reward effort equitably: a 
copyright product derived from little effort may yield substantially 
greater return than one resulting from significant investment.20 
Copyright laws, if they reward effort, also permit owners to recoup 
many times more than the cost of effort or investment. According to 
Hettinger, the argument that intellectual property regulation provided 
incentive to innovate is facile until it is verified by “substantial empirical 
evidence”.21 Writing in 1989, he pointed out the sterility of debating the 
merits of intellectual property law without reference to empirical 
evidence. Debate, it might be said, had not advanced in 23 years: in 
1989 Hettinger drew exactly the lesson from his investigations as that 
adduced by Hurt and Schuchman in 1966. In the intervening two 
decades, however, the weight of opinion concerning copyright 
regulation had shifted, and current orthodoxy – that it promotes 
production and dissemination – became predominant. 
The change may partly be ascribed to the rise of the law-and-economics 
movement and the proselytising work of two of its chief proponents, 
Harold Demsetz, who developed Coase’s ideas in the 1967 paper 
Towards a Theory of Property Rights, and Richard Posner. Demsetz  
placed particular stress of the need for strong, enforceable property 
rights in a liberal society while Posner emphasise the role played by 
property rights in giving individuals the security to engage in  
productive activity.22 
Out of their work grew the idea that the creation of property rights is a 
necessity, not an option, for policy-makers. In the schema they  
mapped for government, primacy is given to needs of property owners 
and their rights may be qualified only to the extent that limitations do 
not harm their economic interests. As Posner made clear in his analysis 
of the fair use doctrine, which involved comparing the needs of 
consumers with those producers, government may strike a “balance” 
between the needs of owners and consumers of copyright material,  
                                                     
20 “Justifying Intellectual Property”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1989) 18, pp 31-52.  
21 At p51.  
22 Economic Analysis of the Law, Little, Brown, 1973.  
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but it must also give priority to promoting production rather  
than dissemination.23 
The law and economics movement created the conditions for 
government policy-makers to delineate a countervailing dichotomy 
between the perceived interests of owners-producers and public-
consumers. Posner has declared himself uncertain how to strike an 
equitable balance between the interests of these two groups,24 but 
government betrays few doubts, or chooses to let the judiciary 
determine the scope of public access to copyright material. 
Governments around the world seem unshakeably attached to the idea 
that “balance” is the key to creating optimum production and 
dissemination. Implicitly, stimulating production remains their 
fundamental objective. 
A 2000 study of copyright and economic theory25 makes a qualified 
case for copyright regulation but the qualifications are greater than 
those allowed by copyright orthodoxy. The study does not, for 
instance, discriminate between the interests of producers and 
consumers26 and does not recommend an expansionary approach to 
regulation: it argues that while rights should be clearly defined, their 
scope ought to be determined by consulting the needs of all groups in 
society, and alternatives to copyright regulation explored. 
The study also argues that thinking on copyright regulation has been 
strongly influenced by studies between 1969 and 1990 on the optimal 
scope of patent law.27 So far as theory is concerned, however, it does 
                                                     
23 See e.g. W Landes and R Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” 
(1989) Journal of Legal Studies, 18, pp325–363.  
24 Interview in Reason, 36, 1 April 2001, University of Chicago Law School.  
25 Richard Watt, Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes? Edward Elgar, 2000. 
After a comprehensive survey of the economic literature on copyright, Watt looks 
at Pareto modelling of the benefits of copyright. According to Pareto theory, if 
regulation benefits some and disadvantages none, it should be introduced. Similarly, 
if its removal benefits some and disadvantages none, it should be removed. 
However, the Pareto modelling studies of the 1980s and 1990s allow for no solid 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the efficacy of copyright regulation.  
26 Although it points out the difficulty of determining the efficacy of regulation as 
arguments for and against copyright are predicated on subjective determination of 
what constitutes “social welfare”. (See p123). According to Watt, social welfare is 
“impossible to measure empirically”.  
27 Watt cites as the most significant influences, Nordhaus, Invention Growth and 
Welfare. A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change (1969) Cambridge MA, The 
MIT Press, Scherer, 1972, “Nordhaus’ Theory and Optimal Patent Life: A 
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not seem that the polarities of debate are exercising a continuing 
influence on government thinking. Even the middle ground, perhaps 
best represented by Stephen Breyer,28 who observed that neither 
regulation nor its absence has a noticeable effect on social efficiency, 
seems to be ignored. 
Bjorn Frank crystallised the dilemma of modern regulators in 1996:  
in framing copyright laws, he said, government must solve the  
problem of “the Scylla of underutilisation … [and] the Charybdis of 
underproduction”.29 It is not certain that theory nowadays offers much 
that government wants to hear. Copyright orthodoxy seems to be an 
impermeable doctrine uninformed by theoretical scepticism or 
knowledge of history. 
                                                                                                           
Geometrical Reinterpretation” (1972) American Economic Review, 62, pp428–430, 
Tandon, “Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing”, Journal of Political Economy 
(1982) 90, pp 470-486, Gilbert and Shapiro “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth” 
(1990) RAND Journal of Economics, 21, pp 106–112, Klemperer, “How Broad Should 
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28 “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies 
and Computer Programs”, Harvard Law Review (1970) 84, p281–351.  
29 “On an Art Without Copyright”, Kyklos, 49, pp 3-15.  
